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China has recently updated its laws on the (security) screening of foreign investment, 
promulgated a new export controls law, drawn up an ‘unreliable entity’ list, and adopted an 
EU-style statute blocking the extraterritorial jurisdiction of US law. Beijing wages legal warfare 
(‘lawfare’) against Hong Kong, in the South China Sea, along the Belt and Road, and in 
cyberspace. Given today’s global geopolitical contestation it is only a matter of time before the 
European Union feels the grip of the long arm of Chinese law. Historically, the EU Blocking 
Regulation has provided for a unified European response to the extraterritorial application of 
sanctions. However, the proliferation of such sanctions requires a deeper debate on possible 
additional measures to increase deterrence and, if needed, to counteract them. This paper asks 
how the EU might prepare to be better protected against such lawfare, and finds inspiration in 
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1. Introduction  
Recent US sanctions directed against third parties engaging with Iran and Russia have attracted 
a lot of attention because they affect European business operations and undermine the EU’s 
ability to autonomously strategise the course of its trade and investment policies. A review of 
such ‘secondary sanctions’ regimes and their evolving geopolitical contexts predicts that the 
People’s Republic of China (PRC) will follow suit in using these measures.1 With the ink on the 
EU-China Comprehensive Agreement on Investment not yet dry,2 the flexing of Beijing’s legal 
muscles lends further credence to warnings not to go soft on economic relations with a 
‘systemic rival’.3  
This paper adds to the prescriptions to correct Europe’s strategic myopia in defining its 
relations with China by conducting an exploratory examination of the long arm of Chinese law 
(Section 5). It does so in the light of established practice of the Treasury Department in 
exercising extraterritorial jurisdiction of US law (Section 4). Before addressing the question of 
how the EU might prepare to protect itself better against ‘lawfare’4 from China and the US 
(Section 6), a few general observations will be made on the nature and aims of sanctions 
(Section 2) and their extraterritoriality (Section 3). 
2. Nature and aims of sanctions 
Sanctions constitute one of the most frequently used foreign policy tools in international 
relations. Yet the term ‘sanctions’ does not have any commonly agreed definition. The term 
can simultaneously carry a positive connotation, as when one speaks of the ‘legal sanction’ in 
the sense of conferring on a title or a normative proposition the legitimacy of law. Most of the 
time, however, the notion carries the negative connotation of a penalty or a punishment of 
deviant behaviour.  
 
1 This paper is based on the author’s contribution to T. Stoll et al., ‘Extraterritorial Sanctions on Trade and 
Investment and European Responses’, Study requested by the Committee on International Trade (INTA) of the 
European Parliament and published as doc. PE 653.618 by the Policy Department for External Relations 
Directorate General for External Policies of the Union, November 2020. The author is grateful to Weinian Hu, 
Research Fellow in the Regulatory Policy unit of CEPS, for her contribution to section 5 of this paper. 
2 The ‘unscrubbed’ text was published on 22 January 2021 on the website of the European Commission’s DG Trade 
at https://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=2237 (last accessed 22 January 2021). 
3 The term ‘systemic rival’ was introduced by the European Commission and High Representative for Foreign 
Affairs and Security Policy, ‘EU-China: A strategic outlook’, JOIN(2019) 5 final, 12 March 2019. For a critical review 
of Europe’s fast-tracked ‘in principle’ conclusion of negotiations of the investment treaty with China before US 
President Joe Biden took office, see N. Barkin, ‘Watching China in Europe’, January 2021. 
4 ‘Lawfare’, a term coined in 2001 in the US, has effectively deployed financial, insurance and energy law to boost 
US power and check that of its adversaries. See C.J. Dunlap, ‘Law and Military Interventions: Preserving 
Humanitarian Values in 21st Century Conflicts’, Speech prepared for the ‘Humanitarian Challenges in Military 
Intervention Conference’, Carr Center for Human Rights Policy Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University 
Washington, D.C., 29 November 2001. China has explicitly adopted the concept of ‘legal warfare’ (falu zhan) and 
applies it in Hong Kong, in the South China Sea, along the Belt and Road, in cyberspace and actual space. See D. 
Cheng, ‘Winning Without Fighting: Chinese Legal Warfare’, Report for The Heritage Foundation, 21 May 2012. See 
also S. Blockmans, ‘Why Europe Should Harden its Soft Power to Lawfare’, CEPS Commentary, 15 June 2020. 
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The international lawyer Jean Combacau defined sanctions as “measures taken by a state acting 
alone or jointly with others in reply to the behaviour of another state, which, it maintains, is 
contrary to the international law”.5 Thus, the idea of imposing sanctions presupposes a breach 
of an international norm. Georges Abi-Saab and other eminent scholars have confirmed this, 
by defining a sanction as a coercive response to an internationally wrongful act authorised by 
a competent social organ.6 It may be inferred from that definition that a ‘competent social 
organ’ is not an individual state acting in its own right (i.e. no ‘private justice’), but rather a 
body authorised to act on behalf of a collective interest, such as, for example, the UN Security 
Council (UNSC) or the Council of the European Union.7  
In international relations, sanctions are not limited to the interruption of economic relations 
but encompass measures devoid of economic significance, such as diplomatic sanctions. 
Moreover, beyond their traditional use by states, sanctions have been adopted by international 
organisations to assist them in fulfilling their mandates. 
In more recent practice, sanctions have been widely understood to be imposed in reaction to 
behaviour that the sender, individual states or international organisations, considers 
objectionable, even if this has not been codified as illegal. EU law professor Panos Koutrakos 
describes sanctions as measures that “connote the exercise of pressure by one state or 
coalition of states to produce a change in the political behaviour of another state or group of 
states”.8 This comes closer to the ‘effects doctrine’ that the US has subscribed to in 
international law.9 
It is widely recognised by scholarship that compliance is often not the only, or even the primary, 
aim of sanctions but that they fulfil other functions. These include the desire to demonstrate 
the sender’s willingness and capacity to act, to anticipate or deflect criticism, to maintain 
certain patterns of behaviour in international affairs, to deter further engagement in the 
objectionable actions by the target and third parties, to support international institutions, to 
promote subversion in the target, or to assuage domestic audiences.10 While each situation 
may see a combination of two or more of these objectives, the central aim of restrictions 
 
5 Combacau, C. (1992), ‘Sanctions’, in R. Bernhardt (ed), Encyclopedia of Public International Law, Amsterdam: 
North-Holland, at 313. 
6 Abi-Saab, G. (2001), ‘The Concept of Sanction in International Law’, in Gowlland-Debbas, V. (eds.), United Nations 
Sanctions and International Law, The Hague: Kluwer Law International, at 39. 
7 See also Crawford, J. (2001), ‘The Relationship Between Sanctions and Countermeasures’, in Gowlland-Debbas, 
V. (eds.), United Nations Sanctions and International Law, The Hague: Kluwer Law International. 
8 Koutrakos, P. (2001), Trade, Foreign Policy and Defence in EU Constitutional Law: The Legal Regulation of 
Sanctions, Exports of Dual-use Goods and Armaments, Oxford: Hart Publishing, at 49. 
9 See N. Samie (1982), ‘The Doctrine of "Effects" and the Extraterritorial Application of Antitrust Laws’, University 
of Miami Inter-American Law Review, Vol. 14, No. 1, 23-59. 
10 See Barber, J. (1979), ‘Economic sanctions as a policy instrument’, International Affairs, Vol. 55, No. 3, 367–384; 
and Lindsay, J. M. (1986), ‘Trade sanctions as policy instruments: A re-examination’, International Studies 
Quarterly, Vol. 30, No. 2, 153–73. 
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imposed in reaction to undesirable acts is mostly geared toward exercising pressure to alter 
the political behaviour of the targeted parties.11 
During the second half of the 20th century, trade embargoes and other restrictive measures of 
an economic nature were the preferred means of putting pressure on rogue states. Such 
‘economic sanctions’, fourteen cases of which were imposed by the UN and more than fifty by 
the US and the EU combined,12 have been defined as the “deliberate, government inspired 
withdrawal, or threat of withdrawal, of customary trade or financial relations”.13  
Economic sanctions such as comprehensive trade embargoes often produce indiscriminate and 
perverse effects in target countries. The humanitarian catastrophe caused by the 
comprehensive UN embargo on Iraq in the early 1990s is a case in point.14 Practice has also 
taught governments that economic sanctions might hurt the domestic economy of a 
sanctioning state as well, depending on market size and trade flows. Lessons have been learned 
from Russia’s counter-sanctions against restrictive measures adopted by the EU, prohibiting, 
inter alia, European businesses from investing in the modernisation of Russia’s energy sector 
as a reaction to Russia’s war against Ukraine.15 The Russian counter-sanctions included 
pressure on France not to halt its plans to deliver €1.2bn worth of warships to Russia; and on 
food and plant exports from Italy, the Netherlands and other EU countries.16 The European 
Commission and the European External Action Service (EEAS) now routinely conduct an impact 
assessment of a sanctions campaign on EU economies before adopting restrictive measures. 
This gives member states’ experts time to haggle over the details of the restrictive measures. 
The EU prefers to employ ‘targeted’ sanctions, which departs from the full economic 
embargoes that dominated the international landscape up until the mid-1990s. Yet the 
negative conditionality tied to its ‘restrictive measures’ imply that economic pain is inflicted on 
the target. Targeted (or ‘smart’) sanctions were designed precisely to correct the above-
mentioned effects. Because they do not presume to affect the economy as a whole, they are 
not expected to bear significant humanitarian consequences, impoverishing the population and 
criminalising society. By putting the punitive spotlight on members of the leadership and the 
 
11 See Portela, C. (2014), ‘The EU’s Use of ‘Targeted’ Sanctions: Evaluating Effectiveness’, CEPS Working Document 
No. 391, March. 
12 See Cortright, D., and G. A. Lopez (eds.) (2002), Smart Sanctions: Targeting Economic Statecraft, Lanham: 
Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, at 1. 
13 Hufbauer, G. C., J. J. Schott, K. A. Elliott and B. Oegg (2007), Economic Sanctions Reconsidered, 3rd ed., 
Washington, D.C., Peterson Institute for International Economics, at 3. 
14 See Mueller, J., and K. Mueller (1999), ‘Sanctions of Mass Destruction’, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 78, No. 3, 43-53. 
15 Council Regulation (EU) No 833/2014 of 31 July 2014 concerning restrictive measures in view of Russia's actions 
destabilising the situation in Ukraine, OJ 2014 L 229/1. 
16 See Blockmans, S. (2014), ‘How should the EU respond to Russia’s war in Ukraine’, CEPS Commentary, 
September. 
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elites they hold responsible for wrongdoings, the senders attempt to signal to the citizenry that 
they do not seek to cause general harm.17  
Nevertheless, the types of measures considered ‘targeted’ actually feature different degrees 
of ‘targetedness’: oil embargoes hit the economy far harder than arms embargoes and lead to 
a much wider proliferation of circumvention tactics.18 Thus, arranged as a continuum, visa bans 
would constitute the most discriminatory measure, while sanctions affecting transportation or 
the financial sector would have the widest consequences.19 The EU sanctions’ practice seems 
designed to follow a gradual approach: from asset freezes and visa bans on natural and legal 
persons to more comprehensive sanctions prohibiting European traders and investors from 
engaging with blacklisted counterparts. 
Reductions in aid or suspension of trade preferences adopted under Article 96 of the 
Partnership Agreement between the members of the African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of 
States, on the one part, and the European Community and its member states on the other part 
(Cotonou Agreement) are referred to as ‘appropriate measures’. In the context of the European 
Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), the phrase ‘less for less’ is preferred to tie a drop in financial 
support by the EU to backsliding of reforms by the authorities of a neighbouring country. The 
withdrawal of the application of the Generalised System of Preferences (GSP) from 
beneficiaries is not referred to as a sanction either, even if, like most of the restrictive measures 
mentioned above, they are intended to produce effects on the trade with targeted countries.20  
3. Extraterritoriality 
Since the outbreak of the global financial crisis in 2008, the security environment has been 
marked by a shifting balance of power, an increasing use of
 
hybrid threats, space and cyber 
warfare, disinformation, and the growing role of non-state actors.21 While these developments 
have pushed the EU toward a proliferation of targeted sanctions mechanisms, including the 
creation of sanctions lists for ‘horizontal’ (as opposed to ‘vertical’, i.e. country-specific) 
purposes, such as the fight against chemical and cyber warfare,22 and against violators of 
 
17 See Portela, C. (2010), European Union Sanctions and Foreign Policy: When and Why Do They Work? London: 
Routledge. 
18 See Blockmans, S. (2013), ‘Curbing the circumvention of sanctions against Iran over its nuclear programme’, 
Common Market Law Review, Vol. 50, No. 2, 623-640. 
19 See Biersteker, T., S.E. Eckert and M. Tourinho (2012), ‘Designing United Nations Targeted Sanctions: Findings 
from the Targeted Sanctions Consortium (TSC)’, August 2012. 
20 Portela, C. and J. Orbie (2014), ‘Sanctions under the EU Generalised System of Preferences and foreign policy: 
Coherence by accident?’, Contemporary Politics, Vol. 20, No. 1. 
21 See COM(2020)605 final, EU Security Union Strategy. 
22 See, inter alia, Council Decision (CFSP) 2018/1544 of 15 October 2018 concerning restrictive measures against 
the proliferation and use of chemical weapons, OJ 2018 L 259/25; and Council Regulation (EU) 2019/796 of 17 
May 2019 concerning restrictive measures against cyber-attacks threatening the Union or its Member States, OJ 
EXTRATERRITORIAL SANCTIONS WITH A CHINESE TRADEMARK | 5 
 
human rights (including genocide, extrajudicial killings, and torture),23 the US and China are 
increasingly seeking to extend the reach of their domestic law overseas, compelling foreign 
companies and people to do the bidding of Washington or Beijing. The impact of such 
extraterritorial sanctions driven by political considerations poses new, if indirect, challenges to 
the EU.  
As Gideon Rachman noted in a recent op-ed in the Financial Times: “The rise of 
extraterritoriality is the latest sign of the sad decline of (…) the rules-based international order, 
under which big powers at least pretended to play by the same rules as everybody else.”24 Now, 
the US and increasingly also China seem to think that they can play by different rules. “This 
looks less like the 21st century, as imagined by international lawyers and more like the 19th 
century, in which imperial powers imposed their will on others.”25 
Indeed, when sanctions are imposed or authorised by an institution like the UN Security Council 
or the EU’s Council of Ministers to coerce targeted entities to abort their internationally 
wrongful acts, then questions of extraterritorial jurisdiction generally do not arise. But claims 
have increasingly emerged in the context of economic issues whereby some states, particularly 
the US, seek to apply their laws outside their territory in a manner which may precipitate 
conflicts with other states or international organisations. These measures are referred to as 
‘secondary sanctions’, as opposed to ‘primary sanctions’, which are aimed at targets within the 
sending state’s jurisdiction.26 
The US, and perhaps China, has the power to enforce its laws around the world. For midsize 
powers that is not an option. For the EU, whose normative power extends beyond its 
territory,27 for instance through its application of antitrust legislation and the General Data 
Protection Regulation (GDPR), imposing secondary sanctions to meet political ends is not a 
preferred option. Like smaller players, the Union, which is bound by Article 21 TEU to respect 
and promote international law, rather supports international rules-making bodies such as the 
World Trade Organization (WTO), which has ruled against both China and the US on occasion.  
 
2019 L 129I/1, implemented for the first time in July 2020 against individuals and entities from China, DPRK and 
Russia. 
23 Council Regulation (EU) 2020/1998 of 7 December 2020 concerning restrictive measures against serious human 
rights violations and abuses, OJ 2020 L 410I/1. 
24 Rachman, G. (2020), ‘Beware the long arms of American and Chinese law’, Financial Times, 22 September. 
25 Idem. 
26 See Ruys T. and C. Ryngaert (2020), ‘Secondary Sanctions: A Weapon out of Control? The International Legality 
of, and European Responses to, US Secondary Sanctions’, The British Yearbook of International Law, 
https://doi.org/10.1093/bybil/braa007. 
27 Bradford, A. (2020), The Brussels Effect, Oxford: Oxford University Press; and Torremans, P. (1996), 
‘Extraterritorial Application of EC and US Competition Law’, European Law Review, Vol. 21, No. 4. 
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4. The United States 
The US has gone furthest in the use of extraterritorial law. Its most important weapon is one 
available to no other state — the dollar’s status as the global reserve currency. The rationale 
rests on the premise that foreigners often use the American financial system and so become 
vulnerable to prosecution under US law. Concomitantly the US can threaten foreign companies 
and individuals with financial sanctions, wherever they are.  
The application of American economic sanctions to subsidiaries of US-based corporations 
established in Europe can be traced back to a case of 1961-65 involving an effort by the 
administration of Lyndon Johnson to impose its embargo on trade with China on the French 
subsidiary of the Fruehauf-Seymour Group.28 Several states made diplomatic protests at these 
extraterritorial jurisdiction claims.29 The issue flared up again in the early 1980s when the US 
tried to punish the Soviet Union for the imposition of martial law in Poland by requiring 
European companies like Alsthom-Atlantique to cease work on construction of the Siberia-
Western Europe natural gas pipeline, and thus prevent the export of western technologies to 
the communist bloc.30 Though no court has directly held the US pipeline regulations unlawful, 
they were withdrawn under pressure from the then European Community and its member 
states, which issued several joint démarches.31 
The adoption of legislation in the US imposing sanctions on Cuba, Iran and Libya has stimulated 
opposition in view of the extraterritorial reach of these measures. The extension of sanctions 
against Cuba in the Cuban Democracy Act of 1992, for example, prohibited the granting of 
licences under the US Cuban Assets Control Regulations for certain transactions between US-
owned or controlled firms in the UK and Cuba. This led to the adoption of an order under the 
1980 Protection of Trading Interests Act by the UK government.32  
Amending the 1992 legislation, the adoption of the Helms-Burton Act in March 1996 tightened 
sanctions by providing for, inter alia, the institution of legal proceedings before US courts 
against foreign persons or companies deemed to be ‘trafficking’ in property expropriated by 
Cuba from US nationals.33 In addition, the Act enabled the US to deny entry into the country of 
senior executives (and their spouses and minors) of companies alleged by the State 
Department to be ‘trafficking’. Together with the 1996 D’Amato Act,34 intended to impose 
 
28 ILM (1966), Vol. 5, at 476. The text is available at https://casetext.com/case/united-states-v-fruehauf-2 (last 
accessed 30 December 2020).  
29 See, e.g., Report of the 51st Session of the International Law Association (1964), at 565. 
30 See ‘Current Legal Developments’, ICLQ, Vol. 37 (1987), at 398. 
31 Aides mémoires of 14 March and 28 April 1983, on file with the author.  
32 BYIL (1993), Vol. 64, at 643. 
33 ILM (1996), Vol. 35, at 357. This part of the legislation was suspended by President Clinton for the second half 
of 1996.  
34 ILM (1996), Vol. 35, at 1273. 
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sanctions on persons or entities participating in the development of the petroleum resources 
of Iran or Libya, this legislation was challenged by many states,35 not just for its purported 
violation of international law,36 but also for the threat of litigation and heavy damages. The EU 
in particular took a strong stance on the US approach,37 with the adoption of a ‘Blocking 
Regulation’38 (prohibiting legal persons incorporated in the EU from complying with US law and 
court orders) and the threat of bringing the Helms-Burton Act before a WTO dispute settlement 
panel. The latter attempt was deflected by an undertaking by President Clinton, who had been 
reluctant to sign the Act in the first place, to continue to issue waivers, deferring effectiveness 
of its provisions.39 
Less trigger-happy than some of his predecessors, President Obama preferred to use the power 
of America’s extraterritorial jurisdiction. The Treasury Secretary was Obama’s “favorite 
combatant commander”.40 Among those finding themselves in the Treasury’s crosshairs were 
14 football executives, including nine current or former FIFA officials, arrested in Switzerland 
in 2015 and extradited to stand trial in the US.41 Their mistake was to process allegedly corrupt 
transactions through US banks. Of more geopolitical significance was the sanctions war that 
the US waged to force Iran to the negotiating table and reverse its alleged quest for a nuclear 
weapon.42 For European banks, the severe penalties that were imposed by American financial 
authorities for their dealings with Iran still evoke bad memories. BNP Paribas famously received 
a $9 billion fine in 2014 for violating US sanctions. 
 
35 See Lowe, V. (1997), ‘US Extraterritorial Jurisdiction: The Helms-Burton and D’Amato Acts’, ICLQ, Vol. 46, 378. 
36 OAS Doc. OEA/SER.P AG/doc. 3375/96, 4 June 1996.  
37 See the letter to the Congressional Committee considering changes in the US export control legislation, 
reproduced in ILM (1996), Vol. 35, at 1329; Decision 95/145/EC, ECSC of the Council and the Commission of 10 
April 1995 concerning the conclusion of the Agreement between the European Communities and the Government 
of the United States of America regarding the application of their competition laws, OJ 1995 L 95/45; a démarche 
of the European Community, reproduced in BYIL (1992), Vol. 63, at 725; European Commission Press Release WE 
27/96 of 18 July 1996.  
38 Council Regulation (EC) No 2271/96 of 22 November 1996 protecting against the effects of the extraterritorial 
application of legislation adopted by a third country, and actions based thereon or resulting therefrom, OJ 1996 L 
309/1. Its most important provisions nullify any effects in the EU of any judgment of a court or tribunal and of any 
decision of an administrative authority based on those extraterritorial sanctions (Article 4); forbid EU persons from 
complying with a number of extra-territorial sanctions, unless authorised to do so (Article 5); and allow EU persons 
to recover in court damages caused by those extraterritorial sanctions (‘clawback’ provision) (Article 6). 
39 ILM (1997), Vol. 36, at 529. On 18 May 1998, the Understanding with respect to the Disciplines for the 
Strengthening of Investment Protection was reached, whereby the EU agreed to suspend action in the WTO in 
exchange for an EU-wide exemption by the US from the extraterritorial elements of the Helms Burton Act. See 
BYIL (2006), Vol. 76, at 850.  
40 Lowrey, A. (2014), ‘Aiming Financial Weapons from Treasury War Room’, New York Times, 3 June. 
41 Collett, M., B. Homewood and N. Raymond (2015), ‘World soccer rocked by U.S., Swiss arrests of officials for 
graft’, Reuters, 27 May.  
42 From a wealth of literature, see, e.g., R. Nephew (2018), The Art of Sanctions: A view from the field, New York: 
Columbia University Press. On the EU’s range of defences, see Blockmans, S. (2018), ‘The art of sticking with the 
nuclear deal: Why Europe should defy Trump on Iran’, CEPS Policy Brief No. 2018/01, February.  
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Russia is also a target for US sanctions, which is where the German port of Sassnitz came into 
the picture. Russian ships completing the controversial Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline to Germany 
have been docking there. This attracted the attention of US senators Tom Cotton, Ted Cruz and 
Ron Johnson, who in August 2020 sent a letter to the town and a German company involved in 
the project, threatening them with sanctions.43 Mike Pompeo, then US Secretary of State, 
warned companies involved in Nord Stream to “get out now, or risk the consequences.”44 
German politicians were outraged by this and worry that President Biden may well keep up the 
pressure on Russia instigated by his predecessor. US law is sufficiently vague to make any 
German bank or law firm involved in Nord Stream potentially vulnerable to US prosecution.45  
The Trump administration took up the sanctions cudgel with much enthusiasm. Following the 
crackdown on the pro-democracy movement in Hong Kong, the US targeted Carrie Lam, Hong 
Kong’s chief executive and some of her colleagues. Lam reported that she faced difficulties 
using credit cards.46 But perhaps the most spectacular extraterritorial application of US 
sanctions law by the Trump administration was the arrest of Meng Wanzhou, CFO of Huawei 
Technologies, who was detained upon arrival in Vancouver, Canada on 1 December 2018 on an 
American extradition request for fraud and conspiracy to commit fraud in order to circumvent 
US sanctions against Iran.47 Huawei has also been targeted by US laws that prevent the sale of 
American computer chips to the Chinese tech giant.48 This will make it much more difficult for 
Huawei to roll out its 5G technology around the world.  
Finally, the 2018 US ‘Clarifying Lawful Overseas Use of Data Act’, aka CLOUD Act, amended the 
1986 ‘Stored Communications Act’ (SCA) and gives American law enforcement authorities the 
power to request data stored by most major cloud providers, even if it is electronically-stored 
communications data located outside the US.49 This extraterritorial jurisdiction has raised 
 
43 ‘Sens. Cruz, Cotton, Johnson Put German Port on Notice for Involvement in Russia’s Nord Stream 2 Pipeline’, 
doc. 202-228-7561, 5 August 2020, available at https://www.cruz.senate.gov/?p=press_release&id=5294 (last 
accessed 30 December 2020). 
44 Lee, M. (2020), ‘US warns firms about sanctions for work on Russian pipelines’, The Washington Post, 15 July. 
45 Lohmann, S. and K. Westphall (2019), ‘US-Russia Policy Hits European Energy Supply’, SWP Comment 2019/C 06, February. 
46 Marlow, I. and N. Lung (2020), ‘Hong Kong Leader Carrie Lam Has Credit Card Trouble After U.S. Sanctions’, 
Bloomberg, 18 August.  
47 Fife, R. and S. Chase (2018), ‘Canada arrests Huawei’s global chief financial officer in Vancouver’, Globe and 
Mail, 5 December. 
48 Shepardson, D., K. Freifeld and A. Alper (2020), ‘U.S. moves to cut Huawei off from global chip suppliers as China 
eyes retaliation’, Reuters, 15 May.  
49 H.R.4943 - CLOUD Act - 115th Congress (2017-2018). The CLOUD Act is balanced by a number of safeguards 
intended to prevent abuse. For example, a Stored Communications Act (SCA) order seeking the stored contents 
of communications must be for specific data and will only be granted where the government can establish 
“probable cause” that a particular criminal offence has been committed and that there is “reasonable belief” or 
justification that the information sought is “relevant and material” to that ongoing criminal investigation. It thus 
does not allow mass and indiscriminate collection of communications data. In addition, service providers have the 
right to challenge these SCA orders where they conflict with domestic law.  
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concerns about the safety of (personal) data stored in the cloud and potential conflicts with the 
EU’s GDPR.50 
5. China 
“The very notion of extraterritoriality is sensitive in China, because of its echoes from the 19th century, 
when many foreigners lived under their own laws in Chinese cities such as Shanghai.”51  
Traditionally, when diplomatic tensions become high, China tends to employ a variety of 
‘economic instruments’ to try to punish its opponent – in addition to official protests issued by 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Such measures include launching anti-dumping investigations 
and subsequently imposing high tariffs on products of high demand in China (e.g. Australian 
barley and wines),52 using sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) restrictions to halt agri-food imports 
(e.g. Philippines bananas, Australian beef and Norwegian salmon), suspending treaty 
negotiations (e.g. China-Korea Free Trade Agreement (FTA) against THAAD missile deployment 
in Korea), and issuing travel warnings (e.g. for Chinese students in Australia, citing racial 
incidents).53 In the wake of the ‘in principle’ conclusion of negotiations over its investment 
agreement with the EU, China even threatened to “take all necessary measures” to safeguard 
Chinese firms’ “legitimate rights”, in response to Sweden’s move to exclude Huawei and ZTE 
from its 5G network rollout.54 
To date, China does not have a coherent legal framework for extraterritorial application or to 
improve the settlement system of the renminbi (RMB) cross-border interbank payment system 
(CIPS) to support countermeasures.55 Discussions among legal scholars and practitioners have 
so far focused on understanding how America’s extraterritorial jurisdiction system works and 
on formulating strategies to hedge against and circumvent US sanctions. 
When confronted with extraterritorial jurisdiction, the tactic of non-compliance with evidence 
collection and the recognition and enforcement of judgments has been used on the grounds of 
violations of China’s sovereignty and public order. But Chinese state agencies may consider 
participating in litigation in individual antitrust or human rights cases. Even though their 
arguments may not be admitted in foreign courts’ deliberations, courts will still listen and 
 
50 Church, P. and C. Potratz Metcalf, ‘U.S. CLOUD Act and GDPR - Is the cloud still safe?’, available at 
https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=72241f56-b87e-41d5-8a6e-150d09365a25 (last accessed 30 
December 2020). 
51 Rachman, loc. cit. 
52 See Editorial Board (2020), ‘The worrying precedent in China’s quarrel with Australia’, Financial Times, 29 November. 
53 See Tan, S. (2020), ‘China-Australia relations: Canberra’s plan to scrap research accord labelled ‘act of revenge’ 
over trade dispute’, South China Morning Post, 30 December. 
54 See ‘China to take counter-measure against Sweden over excluding Huawei, ZTE from 5G rollout’, Global Times, 
21 January 2021. 
55 Improving legislation also means strengthening the review mechanism before banking information, data, and 
state secrets may be exported overseas, since they may serve as evidence in court. 
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become acquainted with Chinese laws, procedures and business contexts.56 China does not use 
the argument that its state-owned enterprises (SOEs) would benefit from immunity to 
America’s extraterritorial jurisdiction, in anti-dumping investigations and civil litigation. But 
China’s claim that its SOEs are not public bodies has been dismissed by US courts, some of 
which have voluntarily granted immunity from prosecution in civil litigation to companies 
directly controlled by the Chinese central and local governments that are not operating in the 
US.57 Chinese companies are generally advised to actively participate in litigation and use US 
legislation to protect their rights. TikTok/ByteDance, for instance, has counter-sued the US 
Commerce Department to confront the implementation of Executive Order 13942, prohibiting 
transactions with the Chinese company for “any provision of services (...) to distribute or 
maintain the TikTok mobile application, constituent code, or application updates through an 
online mobile application store.”58 
A recent flurry of legislative activity nevertheless points to a more concerted effort at shoring 
up China’s defences. In a period of less than a year, Beijing has updated existing laws on the 
(security) screening of foreign investment,59 promulgated a new export controls law,60 drawn 
up an ‘unreliable entities’ list, and adopted a statute to block the extraterritorial effect of 
foreign laws and measures.61 We will briefly explore the latter two innovations. 
Taking a leaf out of the US rulebook, China’s Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) on 20 
September 2020 published its ‘Provisions of Unreliable Entity List’, targeting foreign companies 
accused of endangering Chinese national security.62 The provisions are based on the PRC’s 
Foreign Trade Law and National Security Law. According to Article 2, restrictions and 
prohibitions can be imposed with immediate effect on “foreign entities” (i.e. individuals, 
enterprises and organisations) that are “endangering the national sovereignty, security, or 
development interests of China”. In the same vein “normal transactions with Chinese 
 
56 For example, China’s Ministry of Commerce has appeared in court in the “Vitamin C Anti-Monopoly Case” 
(Animal Science Products, Inc. v. Hebei Welcome Pharmaceutical Co. Ltd.), referring to the Chinese law on the 
price fixing of imports and exports by enterprises. Although the Ministry’s oral arguments and written opinions 
were not admitted by the Supreme Court, US federal courts took note of the Chinese government’s positions. In 
many previous cases involving the Chinese government and officials, the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs has 
submitted written opinions to refer US federal courts to the Chinese government’s position.  
57 Li, Q. (2019), ‘On American Extraterritorial Jurisdiction: Concept, Practice and China's Response’, Chinese Review 
of International Law, Vol. 3 (in Chinese). 
58 See Commerce Department Statement on US District Court Ruling on TikTok Preliminary Injunction: 
https://www.commerce.gov/news/press-releases/2020/09/commerce-department-statement-us-district-court-
ruling-tiktok (last accessed 30 December 2020). 
59 Wang, O. (2021), ‘China’s national security screening rules for foreign investments enter force’, South China 
Morning Post, 19 January. 
60 Bush, N., S. Fang, J. Zhang and R. Xu (2020), ‘China’s New Export Law’, DLA Piper, 19 October. 
61 Beijing has also vowed to invoke Article 5 of the Cybersecurity Law to take measures to monitor, defend and 
deal with cybersecurity risks and threats originating from within and outside the country. 
62 Available at: http://english.mofcom.gov.cn/article/policyrelease/questions/202009/20200903002580.shtml 
(last accessed 30 December 2020). 
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enterprises, organisations, or individuals [can be suspended], in violation of market-based 
principles”, when seriously harming the legitimate rights and interests of such Chinese 
operators. As such, MOFCOM has cast a wide net, delegating the interpretation and 
implementation of the provisions to a new ‘working mechanism’. By virtue of Article 10, 
unreliable foreign entities may be restricted or prohibited from engaging in China-related 
import or export activities, investing in China, and/or entering into China. Their work or 
residence permit may be restricted or revoked, fines may be imposed, and so on.  
By publishing the Chinese equivalent of the EU’s Blocking Regulation on 9 January 2021 the 
Ministry of Commerce moved its regulatory defences up another notch. Even if the US is 
mentioned nowhere in the text, MOFCOM’s order is in practice intended to block the 
extraterritorial effect of American secondary sanctions. In substantive terms, the order draws 
on the legislative design and experience of the EU in terms of the requirement to report 
secondary sanctions (and the threat of fines for operators who don’t), the issuance of 
injunctions, judicial remedies, etc., while also taking into account national conditions and the 
practical needs of the PRC in dealing with what it considers ‘unjustified’ extraterritorial 
application of foreign laws and measures: 
“Article 2: These Rules apply to situations where the extra-territorial application 
of foreign legislation and other measures, in violation of international law and the 
basic principles of international relations, unjustifiably prohibits or restricts the 
citizens, legal persons or other organizations of China from engaging in normal 
economic, trade and related activities with a third State (or region) or its citizens, 
legal persons or other organizations.”63 
Article 2 indirectly refers to secondary sanctions (cf. “third State”) and leaves open the question 
of whether American companies banned by the Treasury Department from doing business with 
China under US primary sanctions would fall outside the application of the Chinese blocking 
statute.64 Pending further clarification from MOFCOM, for instance by adopting an EU-styled 
annex specifying which foreign laws are blocked, one can only speculate.  
Less uncertain is the applicability of the blocking statute to Chinese citizens and any legal 
person under the PRC’s jurisdiction, including therefore foreign joint ventures and wholly 
owned companies registered in China.65 In light of the point made in the previous paragraph, 
 
63 MOFCOM Order No. 1 of 2021 on Rules on Counteracting Unjustified Extra-territorial Application of Foreign 
Legislation and Other Measures, 9 January 2021, available in English at http://english.mofcom.gov.cn/article/ 
policyrelease/announcement/202101/20210103029708.shtml (last accessed 22 January 2021). On the EU’s 
blocking Regulation, see Section 4 of this paper. 
64 See Wang, Z. (2021), China adopts EU-style "blocking statute" - but does it apply to U.S. firms following "primary 
sanctions?", Pekingologist, 10 January, with reference to the Q&A (in Chinese only) with law professor Han Liyu of 
Renmin University published on the website of MOFCOM: http://www.mofcom.gov.cn/article/news/202101/ 
20210103029706.shtml.  
65 Ibid. 
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the statute would thus put its own natural and legal persons in the most difficult position of all. 
However, the Chinese statute also goes further than the EU Blocking Regulation in providing 
the government support necessary to offset significant losses resulting from non-compliance 
with foreign extraterritorial laws and measures (Article 11) and the fact that “the Chinese 
government may take necessary countermeasures based on actual circumstances and needs” 
(Article 12). With respect to the latter, subsidies come to mind. 
While the above-mentioned laws are still settling and waiting to be enforced, it is clear that 
Beijing is moving its weight from the back to the front foot in dealing with the phenomenon of 
extraterritorial jurisdiction. That said, a general understanding in ongoing discussions in China 
is that prudence must be exercised, whether in terms of legislation or tactics, to counter the 
US application of extraterritorial jurisdiction. It is conceded that America is a superpower in 
many aspects, including technology, and that countering the US often does not yield the 
intended results. Before the extraterritorial applicability of Chinese law becomes a reality, 
domestic laws will be further scrutinised in the light of anti-monopoly, national security and 
other legislation and standards.  
Going forward, the Chinese judiciary has been urged to examine domestic legal provisions, laws 
and administrative practices in order to identify which of them might be applied 
extraterritorially with sufficient judicial certainty. For instance, Article 2 of the ‘Law against 
Unfair Competition’, which refers to the term “operators” as natural persons, legal persons and 
unincorporated organisations engaged in the production, operation or provision of services, 
does not specify if overseas individuals or entities fall within the same remit: does the provision 
de facto apply to them? Another example pertains to Article 4, paragraph 3 of China’s 
‘International Criminal Judicial Assistance Law’, which stipulates that:  
“Without the consent of the competent authority of the People's Republic of 
China, foreign institutions, organizations and individuals shall not conduct 
criminal proceedings in the territory of China. Institutions, organizations, and 
individuals within the People’s Republic of China shall not provide evidence 
materials and assistance provided by this Law to foreign countries.” 
This clause does not stipulate the competent authority, approval process, time limit and 
materials to be provided, or the rules of operability. 
With regard to national security, Article 8 of the ‘Anti-Secession Law’ foresees the use of “non-
peaceful means” and other necessary measures to defend national sovereignty and territorial 
integrity should “separative forces” declare Taiwan independent. This provision, in fact a vague 
policy statement in nature, does not in principle qualify for extraterritorial application. In this 
respect, the language of the new National Security Law for Hong Kong (NSL), announced in June 
2020, provides a somewhat sharper example of China’s drive towards the extraterritorial 
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application of domestic law.66 Article 38 of the NSL is so sweeping that it makes even foreigners 
speaking overseas vulnerable to prosecution for ‘subversion’ (Article 1) in China:  
“This Law shall apply to offences under this Law committed against the Hong 
Kong Special Administrative Region from outside the Region by a person who is 
not a permanent resident of the Region.”  
Remarkably, this provision gives the NSL an even broader reach than mainland criminal law, 
according to which a foreigner is not liable for an act that is a crime under the law unless either 
the act or the effect occurs in China. The NSL has no such limitation.  
But as with the interpretation of Article 8 of the Anti-Secession Law, Article 4(3) of the 
International Criminal Judicial Assistance Law and Article 2 of the Provisions of Unreliable Entity 
List, it is ultimately not the substantive definition of the crimes that count but the institutions 
that will investigate, prosecute, and judge them on that matter. In law enforcement, 
‘counterterrorism’ has served as a cover for repressing or monitoring minorities and dissidents. 
With the creation of new law enforcement institutions for Hong Kong dependent on 
appointment and appeals procedures that lead back to the PRC central authorities, the NSL 
that China has imposed on Hong Kong gives Beijing the means to destroy the freedom and 
autonomy the territory has enjoyed since the 1997 handover from the UK.  
Early media reports suggested that many of the city’s business leaders were eager to believe 
that the NSL will be narrowly applied. But less than a year on there is little reason to believe 
that Beijing will apply it with restraint. The government of Xi Jinping has already demonstrated, 
on multiple fronts, its contempt for liberal freedoms.67 Indeed, the NSL is a harbinger of China’s 
emerging power through legal discourse.68 Western universities are taking the threat 
seriously.69 The main fear is that Chinese students could be reported on and pursued for 
straying from Beijing’s official line – perhaps over Taiwan, Hong Kong or the plight of the 
Uighurs in Xinjiang. This risk has only increased as seminars move online, where they can be 
recorded. Some western academics and think tankers are also concerned about their own 
safety and are refusing to travel to China.  
Beijing’s ventures into extraterritoriality have begun with free speech and are unlikely to end 
there. When, for instance, disputes occur over investments made in the context of the Belt and 
 
66 The official English translation of the Hong Kong national security law is available at https://hongkongfp.com/2020/ 
07/01/in-full-english-translation-of-the-hong-kong-national-security-law/ (last accessed 30 December 2020). 
67 See Declaration of the High Representative on behalf of the EU on the postponement of the Legislative Council 
elections in Hong Kong, 3 August 2020; and Liu, N. and P. Riordan (2020), ‘Hong Kong pro-democracy lawmakers 
resign en masse’, 12 November 2020. 
68 See Rudolf, M. (2020), ‘The Hong Kong National Security Law’, SWP Comment No. 56, November. 
69 Professor Patricia Thornton, who teaches Chinese politics at Oxford university, tweeted: “My students will be 
submitting and presenting work anonymously”, as protection against the law. See @PM_Thornton, 22 September 
2020. Professors at US universities have announced similar moves. 
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Road Initiative (BRI), two ‘international’ commercial courts in China are designated to conduct 
the arbitration.70 Going by the canons on conflict of laws and the territoriality-based choice of 
law rules, courts normally respect the freedom of contractual parties to choose the law of the 
forum when determining the applicable law at times of dispute. Chinese law prescribes that, 
where parties to an international contract fail to select the applicable law, the contract will be 
governed by the law of the state that has the closest link to it.71 In case of disputes regarding 
BRI-funded projects, Beijing expects that to be Chinese law.72 Under the present blueprint of 
the BRI’s legal architecture, a lending or any other kind of commercial agreement concluded 
between China and another country will opt for Chinese jurisdiction as the law of the forum in 
the event of dispute.73 If, however, as its leadership proclaims, China is committed to upholding 
and modernising the multilateral trade system,74 then it should mobilise the broad 
international buy-in for its connectivity and growth strategy to fit the BRI with a legal 
architecture and dispute settlement mechanism that spurs international solutions rather than 
imposes Chinese legal constructs.75  
6. European responses 
Extraterritorial sanctions have important economic implications, particularly for the EU and its 
vulnerabilities.76 Extraterritorial sanctions also raise critical questions as to their legality under 
general international law, WTO law and other specific international rules.77 The EU, member 
states and a number of other OECD countries have been especially affected by such measures 
and have taken some action in response. As mentioned above (Section 4), they have, for 
 
70 Between the two courts, one is in Xi’an to arbitrate commercial disputes from projects on the Silk Road Economic 
Belt, one is in Shenzhen for disputes arising from the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road.  
71 See Articles 4 and 6 of the Law on the Laws Applicable to Foreign-related Civil Relations, as well as Article 126 
of the Chinese Contract Law and Article 145 of the General Principle of Civil Law. 
72 For a special series of BRI-relevant judgments rendered by Chinese courts, see the website of the ‘Guiding 
Chinese Cases’ project of Stanford Law School, available at https://cgc.law.stanford.edu/ (last accessed 30 
December 2020).  
73 Recognising and enforcing foreign judgment in China is a difficult undertaking, treacherous and cost intensive. 
See Zhang, W. (2014), Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in China: Rules, Practices and 
Strategies, The Hague: Kluwer Law International.  
74 See, e.g., Ming, Z. (2018), ‘China supports and upholds multilateral trading system’, EUobserver, 26 July. 
75 Blockmans, S. and W. Hu (2019), ‘Systemic Rivalry and Balancing Interests: Chinese Investment Meets EU Law 
on the Belt and Road’, CEPS Policy Insight No. 2019-04, 21 March. In order to achieve a swift and less costly dispute 
settlement solution, one may not be inclined to seek investor-to-state dispute settlement (ISDS) as a solution. In 
recent years, UNCITRAL has identified a few concerns with the mechanism, such as consistency, coherence, 
predictability, correctness of arbitral decisions, cost and duration, which require improvement. Other concerns 
pertain to arbitrators and decision makers, and cost and duration of ISDS cases. For details, see ‘Possible Reform 
of Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS)’, note by the Secretariat, United Nations Commission on International 
Trade Law Working Group III, Thirty-sixth session, Vienna, 29 October – 2 November 2018, A/CN.9/WG.III/WP.149.  
76 See Section 3 of the Study conducted for the INTA Committee of the EP, supra n.1. 
77 Ibid., Section 4. 
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instance, voiced their concerns when the Helms-Burton Act was concluded and adopted 
blocking statutes which are still applicable today.78 Recently, courts in several member states 
have begun to enforce the EU Blocking Regulation more assertively.79 Consistent enforcement 
is central to the statute’s effectiveness. Only if enterprises can expect that the EU regulation 
will be enforced as vigorously as US sanctions legislation will they be inclined to align their 
conduct with European law and disobey diktats from the US Treasury Department. In 2018, 
after the US withdrawal from the Iran nuclear deal, the Commission updated and expanded the 
statute’s application to these laws.80 Arguably, the annex could be expanded further to 
comprise other pieces of US sanctions legislation (e.g. those concerning Nord Stream 2) and 
legal acts adopted by China, such as the Anti-Secession Law and the NSL for Hong Kong. 
To fulfil its potential, the EU Blocking Regulation must be part of a more comprehensive and 
integrated European policy against extraterritoriality. For instance, it would be desirable in the 
future that extraterritorial sanctions adopted by China be countered continuously and 
consistently. Chinese political discourse has proved to be sensitive to international resistance 
to BRI and Covid diplomacy and have led to a change of course by Beijing.81 As a first step, the 
impact of statements on future extraterritorial sanctions could be amplified when issued jointly 
by the EU and like-minded states. Perhaps they could even lead to a clarification of international 
law on the issue. 
In the overall interest of enforcing international law and with the aim of demonstrating the 
EU’s determination and ability to back European companies facing the threat or impact of 
extraterritorial sanctions, recourse to judicial proceedings in China should be welcomed and 
supported, however unlikely their chances of success.82 In this respect, the diplomatic 
 
78 When the administration of US President Trump decided to lift the veto on Part III, the EU, together with 
candidate and EFTA/EEA countries, voiced their deep regret, as did Canada, Mexico, Japan and Russia. Also, the 
EU High Representative/Vice President, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Canada and the EU Commissioner for 
Trade issued a joint statement to consider the extraterritorial application of unilateral Cuba-related measures 
contrary to international law, and further state: “We are determined to work together to protect the interests of 
our companies in the context of the WTO and by banning the enforcement or recognition of foreign judgements 
based on Title III, both in the EU and Canada.” Doc. 190417_13, 17 April 2019. 
79 See, e.g., implementing provisions of the member states on specifying the system of sanctions established by 
Council Regulation (EC) No 2271/96 of November 22, 1996 such as, in the case of Spain, Law 27/1998.  See more 
generally Arif, S. (2019), ‘The EU Blocking Regulation and its Impact on European Companies’, available at 
https://www.kneppelhout.nl/actueel/the-eu-blocking-regulation-and-its-impact-on-european-companies (last 
accessed 30 December 2020).  
80 Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2018/1100 of 6 June 2018 amending the Annex to Council Regulation 
(EC) No 2271/96 protecting against the effects of extra-territorial application of legislation adopted by a third 
country, and actions based thereon or resulting therefrom, OJ 2018 L 199I/1. 
81 Wheatley, J. And J. Kynge (2020), ‘China curtails overseas lending in face of geopolitical backlash’, Financial 
Times, 8 December; and ‘China pulls back from the world: rethinking Xi’s ‘project of the century’’, Financial Times, 
11 December. 
82 In view of, inter alia, the comments made in Section 5 about Article 4(3) of China’s ‘International Criminal Judicial 
Assistance Law’. Incidentally, the draft Comprehensive Agreement on Investment with China does not foresee an 
ISDS mechanism. 
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protection offered by member states is key. In addition, coordination and cost coverage should 
be considered, as is already envisaged in a similar form in the EU Blocking Regulation. In view 
of the dominance of the US dollar in the world economy, it should not be any surprise that the 
modest ‘oil-for-medicines’ barter system created by the Instrument in Support of Trade 
Exchanges (INSTEX) headquartered in Paris did not change business realities and attitudes to 
trading with Iran.83 Ways should be explored to further improve the effectiveness of 
instruments such as INSTEX that secure the flow of essential financial services between the EU 
and its trading partners and to shield the legitimate operations of EU operators, in full 
compliance with multilateral international agreements.  
A more structural solution may be the establishment of an EU Agency of Foreign Assets Control 
(EU-AFAC), an idea that has been knocking around for a while now.84 Unlike the Office of 
Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) as part of the US Treasury Department, there is no EU agency at 
hand to oversee financial channels. An EU-AFAC could develop common standards, tools and 
certification mechanisms for due diligence to boost the confidence of European businesses that 
they are engaged in trade and investment with countries subject to the extraterritorial 
jurisdiction applied by third counties.85  
Such an EU agency could thus assist European companies seeking waivers and exemptions from 
American and – in the future – Chinese authorities. An EU-AFAC could strengthen EU legal 
protections for entities engaged in trade and investment with high-risk markets by developing 
guidelines related to a reinforced blocking regulation and by creating linkages to laws that 
underpin the Single European Payments Area (SEPA). This would ensure that institutions within 
the wider European banking system could not arbitrarily deny services to gateway banks or 
European businesses, effectively quarantining them because of their sustained links to high-
risk jurisdictions. An EU Agency of Foreign Assets Control could – in theory – play a broad role 
in defending the bloc’s economic sovereignty and facilitating international trade and 
investment. But creating such an agency would be a challenge, not least because it would 
probably require Treaty change,86 for which no unity exists among member states, some of 
 
83 Germany, France and the UK established, with technical and financial support from the Commission services 
and the EEAS, INSTEX as a special-purpose vehicle to facilitate payments for legitimate trade between the EU and 
Iran. The instrument was launched in January 2019, and five other member states (Belgium, Denmark, Finland, 
the Netherlands, and Sweden) and Norway have since joined as shareholders. See also Geranmayeh, E. and M. 
Lafont Rapnouil (2019), ‘Meeting the Challenge of Secondary Sanctions’, ECFR. 
84 See, e.g., Lohmann, S. (2016), ‘The Convergence of Transatlantic Sanction Policy against Iran’, Cambridge Review 
of International Affairs, 29:3, 930-951; and Lohmann, S. and K. Westphall (2019), ‘US-Russia Policy Hits European 
Energy Supply’, SWP Comment 2019/C 06, February. 
85 ‘France urges Europe to push back against 'unacceptable' US sanctions on Iran’, France24, 11 May 2018. 
86 A careful consideration is warranted here, in view of the tasks and the feasibility of such EU institutional 
structure, the relationship between the EU and its member states and the allocation of competences, and with 
regard to the democratic legitimacy, accountability and parliamentary control mechanisms. 
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which are wary of undermining their significant trade and investment flows with the US and 
China.87 
Indeed, when assessing the impact of foreign direct investments into the EU on security 
grounds, the Commission, in cooperation with member state authorities, should consider the 
likelihood that the transaction will make the EU target company more inclined to abide by 
extraterritorial sanctions, regardless of the country that imposed them.  
In view of responses that aim to challenge the legality of American and Chinese extraterritorial 
sanctions, WTO dispute settlement is key. US criticism of the WTO has been directed against 
appellate procedure and the Appellate Body. WTO dispute settlement at panel stage is not 
affected and is being used by the US and other WTO members to the same extent as before. 
Clarification can be expected from the various panel reports on complaints against the US tariff 
measures on steel and aluminum, which are due to be circulated soon.88 These reports will 
signify to what extent the more restrictive interpretation of the national security exemption 
will be further manifested. And because similarly worded (national security) exemptions are 
common in other areas of international economic law treaties, including friendship, commerce 
and navigation treaties, bilateral and multilateral investment treaties and FTAs, a report by a 
WTO panel could be influential also in dispute settlement under those agreements and help 
clarify the legal limits of the use of extraterritorial jurisdiction. Bringing a complaint could 
therefore strengthen the EU’s reputation as a defender of the global rule-based trade and 
investment system. 
Barring recourse to judicial protection, the EU might respond to extraterritorial sanctions by 
way of retorsion and thus act in a way that is unfavourable but lawful. In this respect it is worth 
noting the European Commission’s recent proposals to strengthen the role of the euro to 
obtain greater monetary autonomy and to make EU-based financial-market structures more 
resilient  to disruptive actions by third countries, including through the unlawful extraterritorial 
application of sanctions.89 The sanctions information exchange repository envisaged by the 
Commission should encompass (anonymous) reporting on extraterritorial measures imposed 
by third countries to ensure, inter alia, that national penalties for breaching the EU Blocking 
Regulation are effective, proportionate and dissuasive.  
In parallel, the Commission is carrying out a review of its trade policy90 and has signalled its 
intention to bring forward a proposal to deter and counteract coercive actions by third 
 
87 There is, frankly, more mileage in improving the blocking regulatory system and coordination of implementation 
by member states. 
88 This includes complaints by China - DS 544; India - DS 547; the EU - DS 548; Canada - DS 550; Mexico - DS 551; 
Norway - DS 552; Russian Federation - DS 554; Switzerland - DS 556 and Turkey - DS 564. 
89 European Commission, ‘The European economic and financial system: fostering openness, strength and 
resilience’, COM(2021) 32 final, 19 January 2021.  
90 European Commission, ‘A renewed trade policy for a stronger Europe’, Consultation Note of 16 June 2020, available 
at: https://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2020/june/tradoc_158779.pdf (last accessed 22 January 2021). 
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countries no later than the fourth quarter of 2021.91 With respect to the latter, it is worth 
recalling that retorsion includes countermeasures in the sphere of diplomatic and consular 
relations, cultural exchanges, etc. A specific but unpopular countermeasure could be the 
blocking of financial transactions by the SWIFT system, which is constituted under Belgian law 
and subjected to European legislation and has in the past been used in connection with the 
implementation of UN sanctions. Imposing restrictions on financial transactions undertaken by 
SWIFT would, however, not only place serious burdens on foreign relations and on transatlantic 
relations in particular, it would also entail economic effects that could affect European 
businesses. Blocking financial transactions by the SWIFT system should therefore be considered 
only as a measure of last resort in case of a grave violation of international law with important 
repercussions on the EU, its member states and European enterprises, after the application of 
all other options has failed. 
The above-mentioned measures could be used in combination. But in exploring realistic 
recommendations, the brittle character of common political will within the EU and the 
vulnerabilities of individual member states exposed to countermeasures should be kept in 
perspective. It is also important to understand how other (like-minded) states, such as 
Australia, Canada and Japan, and to a lesser extent Mexico and Switzerland, are affected and 
what positions they take. As the European Parliament has recently recalled,  
“[t]he EU should continue to work with the US as a partner with whom it has 
to find solutions to trade issues of common interest and also to threats and 
to trade frictions, including the extraterritorial application of laws adopted by 
the US which are contrary to international law”.92  
The rationale of seeking cooperation with the US rather than with China on these matters is 
not only grounded in the constitutional DNA and protection of fundamental rights shared by 
the transatlantic partners. It also rests on the belief that stronger cooperation with the US will 
help the EU supranational institutions in building coherence between individual member 
states. On this basis options for more strategic action vis-à-vis systemic rivals that prey on open 
economies and democratic institutions could be discussed. 
 
91 Letter of Intent to President David Maria Sassoli and to Chancellor Angela Merkel, 16 September 2020, available 
at: https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/state_of_the_union_2020_letter_of_intent_en.pdf (last accessed 22 
January 2021). See also Commission Work Programme 2021, available at: https://ec.europa.eu/info/publications/ 
2021-commission-work-programme-key-documents_en (last accessed 22 January 2021). 
92 European Parliament resolution of 7 October 2020 on the implementation of the common commercial policy – 
annual report 2018 (2019/2197(INI)). In the same vein, see the statement by the European Commission and the 
High Representative, ‘A new EU-US agenda for global change’, JOIN(2020) 22 final, 2 December 2020, at 10. 
